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Intimate Partner Violence and Labour Market Outcomes in Tanzania 
 






This paper takes data from the Tanzania National Panel Survey (TNPS) (2008-2009), fits them 
to the probit model to examine factors driving the probability of women to experience IPV 
(Intimate Partner Violence) and uses the propensity score matching to estimate the effect of 
IPV on women’s probability of employment and earnings. The results show that the levels of 
IPV in Tanzania are still alarmingly high, relative to the levels in the developed countries. It is 
found that IPV is exacerbated by some male characteristics, including alcohol abuse, young 
age, polygamy, cohabitation, among others, with violence being higher in the rural areas than 
in the urban areas. In addition, low property ownership for women is found to contribute to the 
problem. A majority of women accept to live by the oppressing traditional norms, which they 
are using to justify IPV. The study finds IPV to be a catalyst to self-employment for women, 
which may enhance their bargaining. However, the negative side is that the business incomes 
from such self-employment ventures are likely to be depressed. In view of these findings, we 
still need to continue the fight against IPV. 
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This paper analyses the association between intimate partner violence against women and 
access to labour opportunities in Tanzania. Domestic violence against women is a violation of 
the basic human rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1991). According to World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2013), about 35% of women have experienced violence against them in 
their lifetime, most of which is intimate partner violence (IPV). This violence against women 
is higher in developing countries than in developed countries (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2006). 
With 45.6% of women subject to lifetime IPV, Africa has recorded the highest levels of 
violence against women than where in the world. 
 
Data on Tanzania show that 44% of ever-married women have experienced physical or sexual 
violence by their current/most recent partner, in their lifetime (TDHS, 2010). Domestic 
violence impinges immense social costs to society, which include the following. First is the 
economic costs, in terms of negative multiplier effects due to decreased female labour 
participation and reduced productivity at work. Second is the reduced quality of life and 
intergenerational transmission of violence. Third are the health effects such as injuries, 
depression, alcohol and drug abuse, resulting in increased mortality. Lastly are the resultant 
costs of treating or preventing domestic violence (Buvinic et al 1999; Aizer 2010; Aizer 2011). 
Women’s access to labour market opportunities promise improvement in their lives. For 
instance, the World Development Report lists promoting women’s access to economic 
opportunities as one of its top five policy priorities for promoting gender equality (World Bank, 
2012). Women’s access to labour market opportunities tends to decrease early marriage and 
childbearing (Heath, 2014). Additionally, empirical evidence shows that access to labour 
market opportunities improves women’s bargaining power within a household (Anderson & 
Eswaran, 2009; Majlesi, 2012; Rahman & Rao, 2004). 
 
On the negative side, job opportunities for women may have negative consequences if the work 
changes the existing relations within households and husbands respond with increased 
domestic violence. Theoretical household bargaining models show how a woman’s access to 
economic opportunities can affect violence negatively or positively, depending on her initial 
level of bargaining power (Eswaran & Malhotra, 2011; Rao, 1997; Tauchen, Witte, & Long., 
1991). A woman could face higher risk of domestic violence after beginning work as her 
husband seeks to offset the increased bargaining power that her income would otherwise bring 
her. Alternatively, an increase in bargaining power for a woman who already has high 
bargaining power can decrease domestic violence, since work opportunities increase the 
probability of fleeing from a bad marriage. 
 
Violence against women may also affect a woman’s economic well-being through its effect on 
her health. According to the human capital theory, an increase in an individual’s stock of 
knowledge and ‘good’ personal attributes raise a woman’s productivity in the market sector of 
the economy, where she produces money earnings, and in the nonmarket or household sector, 
where she produces commodities that are inclusive in her utility function (Grossman 2000). 
Because IPV affects a woman’s health, it tends to lower her health capital, which is a 
component of women’s human capital. Health capital determines the total amount of time 
available for market and nonmarket activities and the efficiency in undertaking those activities 
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(Grossman 1972). Thus, the human capital theory predicts that IPV consequently results in 
reduced women’s productivity, causing lower earnings in the market sector, and low 
production of commodities, thereby reducing the individual’s and household’s utility.  
 
In some situations, however, violence against women forces women to invoke some coping 
mechanisms for achieving a semblance of normal life. Such adjustment mechanisms entail 
finding labour opportunities, which affords them economic freedom from their husbands. The 
discussed pros and cons render the relationship between intimate partner violence against 
women and labour opportunities an empirical issue. Thus, we have used the data from the first 
wave of the Tanzania National Panel Survey (TNPS), collected in the period 2008-2009, to 
analyse the drivers for IPV towards women and the resulting effect on labour outcomes.  
Specifically, we firstly use the probit model to examine factors driving the probability of 
women to experience IPV; furthermore, we use the propensity score matching to estimate the 
effect of IPV on women’s probability of employment and earnings. 
 
The results show that IPV is mainly male driven, with some male characteristics significantly 
driving the problem. In addition, IPV was found to be a catalyst to self-employment for women, 
which may be a positive coping adjustment and may increase women’s bargaining power. 
However, on the negative side, it was found that IPV tends to hamper productivity, which may 
reduce incomes from such self-employment ventures. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a conceptual framework, which explains 
the links in the relationships analysed; Section 3 describes the data used; Section 4 provides 
the estimation strategy, presents the results and discussion; and Section 5 is the conclusion. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
In the literature, two models serve to explain the socio-economic determinants of women 
violence, which are, the Household Bargaining Model (HBM) and the Male Backlash Model 
(MBM). In Household Bargaining Model, women’s risk to suffer violence is conceptualized 
as a function of their relative bargaining power within the household. The woman’s actual and 
potential economic opportunities outside the home and the accompanying resources improve 
her bargaining power and strengthen her fallback position. The fallback position is the level of 
utility that a woman would derive outside the union should bargaining break down. In the 
cooperative bargaining framework (McElroy and Horney 1981; McElroy 1990), the fallback 
position is explained by several factors, which include market wage rate, nonwage income, 
inherited wealth, education, property rights assignment and legal structure of marriage. On the 
other hand, in the non-cooperative framework where there is no mutual agreement in the 
household, divorce may not be the best option. Instead, each individual retreats to pursue his 
or her own best interest, keeping interaction with the partner at the minimum (Lundberg and 
Pollak 1993). 
 
Empirical evidence with regard to HBM include Panda and Agarwal (2005) who found that 
women who owned land or a house had a statistically significantly lower odds ratio of marital 
violence than women who do not own any property; Aizer (2011), who found that the decline 
in the male-female wage gap explains the reduction in violence against women. Additionally, 
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women’s bargaining power also provides them with an opportunity to influence crucial 
decisions in the households. In this regard, Doss (2006) found that land ownership by women 
significantly increased budget shares on food. 
 
The Male Backlash Model (MDM) (Engle Merry, 2009; Macmillan and Gartner, 1999), posits 
that as the women’s economic power and prospects increases relative to that of men, the 
chances of experiencing violence against them increases because men feel their traditional 
gender role threatened. A woman’s greater economic potential is viewed as the challenge to 
culturally perceived norm of male dominance and female dependence. Men may use violence 
as a tactic to reinstate their authority over their partners if this sign of dominance lacks or to 
prevent their partners from gaining the economic power (Macmillan and Gartner 1999; 
Anderberg and Rainer, 2011). Women face several constraints governed by social norms that 
determine what should be bargained and how the bargaining should be conducted. 
 
Limited empirical evidence on Tanzania that could be found in support of HBM is Vyas et al 
(2015) who found that for a woman, being employed in the informal sector did not reduce her 
risk of experiencing violence; however, it reduced one major trigger for violence: that of 
negotiating money from men. As for MDM, Krishnan et al (2012) showed that the proximate 
determinants of women’s experience of IPV in Tanzania included attitude towards violence 
and opinions about sexual decision-making and power relationship. This paper is has attempted 
to add to the arguably scanty empirical evidence on IPV in Tanzania. 
 
3. Data and Summary statistics 
The paper used data from the first wave of the Tanzania National Panel Survey (TNPS), which 
was collected in the period 2008-2009. This wave contains information on self-reported 
experience of intimate partner violence by women aged 15-50 years. For this panel data in 
Tanzania, the violence data was collected in the first wave only, which limits the findings to 
that static situation. The violence questions are a subset of the Conflict Tactics Scale developed 
by the World Health Organization. These questions are summarized in Appendix 1. 
 
To each of the violent incident in Appendix 1, a woman would respond either YES or NO. If a 
respondent reported that she had ever experienced any of these acts, she was then asked if it 
had happened in the past 12 months. Thus, in this paper, a woman is considered to have 
experienced violence if she responded YES to at least one of the eight violent incidents. A class 
of binary measures of IPV was constructed in the following way: 
 “IPV in Lifetime” - if a respondent reported to have ever experienced at least one of the 
violent incidents. 
 “Current IPV” - if at least one the violent incident was experienced in the past 12 
months before the survey. 
 
The measure of violence from individual survey data may suffer from self-reporting bias. 
However, the interview process worked to minimize this risk by making the interview private, 
ensuring that no other man or woman was present in the same interview room at the same time. 
The interviewees were ensured of the confidentiality of their responses in that no one would 
learn about their answers; and no one would ever talk to their husbands, boyfriends or parents 
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about what they said in the interview. This included the assurance that her responses would not 
incriminate anyone. The fact that the interviewer was a government agent unknown to them 
and not from their community enhanced the confidentiality. 
 
As for the labour questions, the household’s main respondent was initially asked about each 
household member’s main occupation in the past 12 months. The survey then collected detailed 
information on labour supply from all household members aged above 12 years. Participating 
household members were initially asked: 
 
a) Did [household member] do any work of any type for pay, profit, barter, or home use during 
the last seven days? If the respondents answered No then the respondent was asked 
b) Did you have a job or own farm enterprise at which you did not work during the last seven 
days and to which you will definitely return to work? 
 
A YES response to either question was classified as “currently working” and a NO response to 
both questions was classified as “not working/unemployed.” Working respondents were then 
asked a series of questions whether the work they did was waged and if so their earnings, and 
second, whether they were involved in business or self-employed activity (other than 
agriculture) and if so, the net profit from this business. The questions on labour and self-
employment are summarized in Appendix 2. 
 
The summary statistics are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents the statistics for the 
whole final sample, which consists of 1,781 currently partnered women who live with men in 
the same household as partners. Both partners were interviewed, and the woman responded to 


















                                                             
1 The initial sample consisted of 3616 women who responded to the violence questions. Those who were not 
partnered, and those whose partner was not living in the same household or was not interviewed, were dropped.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Wages 207 1,265,481 2,299,705 0 2.20E+07 
Business Income 395 6,652,036 3.11E+07 0 5.18E+08 
Out of labour force 1,779 0.2406 0.4276 0 1 
Wage employment 1,779 0.1164 0.3207 0 1 
Self-employment 1,779 0.2220 0.4157 0 1 
Lifetime IPV 1,771 0.2874 0.4527 0 1 
Current IPV 1,771 0.1671 0.3732 0 1 
Justify Violence 1,771 0.5974 0.4906 0 1 
Age 1,781 32.954 8.5531 15 75 
Years of schooling 1,781 5.4885 3.4676 0 18 
Own land 1,771 0.2580 0.4377 0 1 
Monogamy 1,781 0.1173 0.3219 0 1 
Polygamy 1,781 0.1325 0.3391 0 1 
Male age 1,781 40.844 11.262 18 87 
Male years of schooling 1,781 6.3739 3.4687 0 18 
Male takes alcohol 1,781 0.1263 0.3323 0 1 
Woman older than a man 1,781 0.0331 0.1790 0 1 
Woman more educated than a 
man 1,781 0.1864 0.3895 0 1 
Same occupation 1,781 0.6277 0.4835 0 1 
Highest education 1,781 7.7669 2.7973 0 18 
Household size 1,781 5.7243 3.0157 2 46 
Log expnd. per capita 1,781 13.211 0.6667 11.419 15.689 
Location (Urban=1) 1,781 0.3442 0.4752 0 1 
 
In Table 1, 28.7% of women were found to have experienced IPV in their lifetime and about 
16.7% of women experienced violence in the 12 months prior to the survey (current IPV). 
These figures are very high relative to those in the developed countries. For example, Aizer 
(2010) found that only 2% of women in the US are subjected to IPV annually. Furthermore, 
the descriptive statistics show that females were younger and less educated than their male 
partners. About a quarter of the women (most of them in the rural areas) own land. A majority 




                                                             
2 These circumstances include the following: she goes out without telling him; she neglects the children; she 
argues with him; she refuses to have sex with him; there are problems with his or her family; there are money 
problems; there is no food at home; and such other reasons. 
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Table 2 compares a few summary statistics for these women between rural and urban areas, 
whereby 1168 are from the rural areas and 613 are from the urban areas. 
 
Table 2: IPV in Rural and Urban areas 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Variable Mean Difference 
  ALL RURAL URBAN Rural -Urban 
IPV in Lifetime 0.287 0.33 0.21 0.12*** 
Current IPV 0.167 0.18 0.13 0.05*** 
Justify violence 0.597 0.63 0.53 0.10*** 
Observations 1781 1168 613   
 
The categorization between the rural and urban areas in Table 2 shows that the levels of 
violence were higher in the rural areas than in the urban areas; specifically, 33% of women in 
the rural areas were found to have experienced IPV in their lifetime, compared to 21% in the 
urban areas. For current IPV, it was 18% compared to 13%, respectively. Furthermore, the 
summary statistics show that women in rural areas justify violence acts against them as 
compared to women in urban areas. This may partly explain the higher rates of IPV in rural 
areas compared to urban areas, as women have been tuned to accept the violent acts as normal 
and justifiable. 
 
4. Empirical Estimation Models and Results 
This section describes the estimation models used for each objective of the study, presents and 
discusses the results. The section also provides a discussion of the limitations of the used 
models and proposes a mechanism for addressing these limitations. 
 
4.1 Analysis of the factors driving intimate partner violence (IPV) 
The probit model was used to examine the factors that drive IPV episodes (for both the violence 
ever experienced (lifetime violence) and the violence experienced in the previous year (current 
violence). A probit model on the factors determining IPV is given as:  
 
𝐼𝑃𝑉𝑖 = 1[𝐹𝑖𝛼 + 𝑀𝑖𝛽 + 𝐻𝑖𝛿 + 𝑖 > 0]      (1) 
 
𝐼𝑃𝑉𝑖  is a binary indicator equal to one if a woman 𝑖 has experienced IPV and zero otherwise. 
Other variables and parameters are defined as follows: 𝐹𝑖  is a vector of woman 𝑖 ’s 
characteristics; 𝑀𝑖 is a vector of the characteristics of the male partner of woman 𝑖; 𝐻𝑖 is a 
vector of household characteristics a woman 𝑖 belongs to; 𝛼, 𝛽 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 are vectors of parameters 
to be estimated and 𝑖  is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed. The 
marginal effects from the probit estimates of the factors determining IPV against women are 
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Table 3: Marginal Effects of Factors Associated with IPV in Tanzania 
 [1] [2] 
VARIABLES Lifetime IPV  Current IPV  















Male years of schooling 
0.00436 0.00171 
[0.00575] [0.00612] 
Male takes alcohol 
0.132*** 0.0934*** 
[0.0361] [0.0213] 







Woman older than a man 
0.0157 0.0179 
[0.0509] [0.0359] 








Years of schooling of hhd 















   
Observations 1,771 1,771 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The empirical results summarized in Table 3 suggest that IPV is mainly associated by male 
characteristics. IPV is significantly, correlated negatively with age of the male partner. The 
younger the male partner is, the higher the probability that the female partner will experience 
IPV. The study also finds that men who take alcohol are associated with more likelihood to 
abuse their female partners. The probability for women with male partners who take alcohol to 
experience violence in their lifetime and in the current period was found to be higher by 13.2% 
and 9.3% percent, respectively.  
 
Polygamy and cohabiting were found to be positively associated with a woman’s likelihood of 
experiencing IPV. Being in a polygamy relationship increases the probability of a woman 
experiencing lifetime violence by 14.1 percent compared to being in a monogamy relationship. 
Women in cohabitation are more likely to experience lifetime violence and violence within 12 
months by 8.8 and 8.3 percent more probability compared to those in monogamy marriages at 
least once in a lifetime. The education of the highly educated member of the household is also 
negatively correlated with episodes of IPV in a household. Living in urban areas is negatively 
associated with IPV. 
 
4.2 Effect on Intimate Partner Violence labour outcomes 
This section presents the analysis of the effect of women’s experience of IPV on labour 
outcomes. The paper analyses three cases of employment status, measured in binary form, 
which are the following:  being out of labour force; having wage employment and being self-
employed. These three cases are not exhaustive of all the possible employment statuses; for 
example, employment in agriculture and family helpers are not included. These cases are also 
not mutually exclusive. For example, one can have a wage employment while at the same time 
may be engaged in other income generating activities classified as self-employment. Therefore, 
the best approach taken for estimation was to analyses each outcome variable in isolation using 
binary response models. A probit model was used to estimate the effect of IPV on the 
probability of employment as given below: 
 
𝐿𝑖 = 1[𝛾𝐼𝑃𝑉𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖𝛼 + 𝑀𝑖𝛽 + 𝐻𝑖𝛿 + 𝑖 > 0]     (2) 
 
Where, 𝐿𝑖 is a binary measure of employment status. Other variables are as follows: 𝐼𝑃𝑉𝑖 is a 
binary indicator equal to one if a woman has experienced IPV and zero otherwise. 𝐹𝑖 is a vector 
of woman 𝑖’s characteristics. 𝑀𝑖 is a vector of the characteristics of the male partner of woman 
𝑖. 𝐻𝑖  is a vector of household characteristics to which woman 𝑖 belongs; 𝛼, 𝛽 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 are vectors 
of parameters to be estimated and 𝑖  is the error term, which is assumed to be normally 
distributed. Table 4 presents the marginal effects from the estimation the probit model in 
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Table 4: Marginal Effects of the Probit Estimation of the Effect of IPV on Employment Status 



















t        
Lifetime IPV 
-0.0146  0.0181  0.0965***  
[0.0253]  [0.0168]  [0.0274]  
Current IPV 
 -0.00942  0.0287  0.0813*** 
 [0.0340]  [0.0190]  [0.0259] 
Justify violence 
0.00972 0.00869 -0.0191 -0.0192 0.00668 0.0129 
[0.0214] [0.0225] [0.0159] [0.0151] [0.0258] [0.0253] 
Age 
-0.00317 -0.00321 0.000843 0.000909 0.00606*** 0.00641*** 
[0.00204] [0.00202] [0.00149] [0.00146] [0.00211] [0.00219] 
Years of schooling 
-0.00187 -0.00195 0.00792*** 0.00796*** 0.00692** 0.00749** 
[0.00580] [0.00581] [0.00296] [0.00301] [0.00333] [0.00333] 
Owns land 
-0.00894 -0.00957 0.0267 0.0265 0.0295 0.0295 
[0.0347] [0.0348] [0.0214] [0.0214] [0.0288] [0.0293] 
Polygamy 
-0.000528 -0.00212 0.00347 0.00518 -0.0220 -0.0119 
[0.0309] [0.0304] [0.0239] [0.0237] [0.0328] [0.0340] 
Cohabiting 
-0.0472* -0.0478* 0.0481* 0.0467* 0.0580 0.0583 
[0.0256] [0.0257] [0.0254] [0.0255] [0.0430] [0.0418] 
Male age 
0.000376 0.000420 5.52e-05 5.87e-05 -
0.00346*** 
-
0.00371*** [0.00120] [0.00121] [0.00131] [0.00130] [ .00126] [ .00126] 
Male years of schooling 
0.00206 0.00206 0.00245 0.00249 0.00275 0.00298 
[0.00724] [0.00730] [0.00464] [0.00464] [0.00897] [0.00895] 
Male takes alcohol 
-0.0879*** -0.0891*** 0.0470* 0.0469* 0.0380 0.0436** 
[0.0218] [0.0222] [0.0275] [0.0277] [0.0234] [0.0220] 
Woman older than a 
man 
-0.0407 -0.0407 0.0610 0.0609 -0.0396 -0.0386 
[0.0459] [0.0457] [0.0383] [0.0381] [0.0490] [0.0501] 
Woman more educated 
than a man 
-0.0135 -0.0127 0.0260 0.0253 0.0271 0.0227 
[0.0400] [0.0400] [0.0214] [0.0218] [0.0395] [0.0391] 
Same occupation 
-0.264*** -0.264*** 0.0724*** 0.0730*** 0.121** 0.121** 
[0.0338] [0.0340] [0.0275] [0.0277] [0.0492] [0.0502] 
Highest education 
-0.00363 -0.00354 0.00285 0.00283 -0.00628 -0.00705 
[0.00603] [0.00603] [0.00588] [0.00599] [0.00976] [0.00993] 
Household size 
-0.0113* -0.0112* -0.00420 -0.00411 -0.000212 -0.000215 
[0.00594] [0.00590] [0.00355] [0.00354] [0.00372] [0.00366] 
Log expnd. per capita 
-0.0407** -0.0409** -0.0189 -0.0181 0.0534*** 0.0559*** 
[0.0196] [0.0193] [0.0189] [0.0187] [0.0183] [0.0181] 
Location (urban=1) 
0.203*** 0.204*** -0.00380 -0.00460 0.202*** 0.193*** 
[0.0294] [0.0293] [0.0270] [0.0267] [0.0487] [0.0501] 
       
Observations 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,771 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results in Table 4 show that on the effect of a woman who has suffered IPV either in her 
lifetime or in the current period is more likely to pursue self-employment than one who has 
not. This result has an intuitive appeal. Women experiencing violence will seek to get their 
own financial freedom to reduce some of the frictions that lead to violence. Whereas obtaining 
a wage employment may take long and needs attainment of some requirements, self-
employment may be a relatively easier way to pursue.  
 
The paper goes further as to analyse the effect of IPV on earnings for those employed. The 
study uses Ordinary least square method (OLS) to estimate that relationship, where the 
outcome variable is the total annual wage or the total annual earnings from self-employment. 
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Table 5: The marginal effect of IPV on earnings from OLS estimation 







     
Lifetime IPV 
0.0409  -0.529*  
[0.182]  [0.299]  
Current IPV 
 0.158  -0.0242 
 [0.156]  [0.303] 
Justify violence 
-0.137 -0.146 -0.136 -0.198 
[0.141] [0.133] [0.177] [0.182] 
Age 
-0.00202 -0.00167 0.0383 0.0363 
[0.0126] [0.0124] [0.0287] [0.0292] 
Years of schooling 
0.0375* 0.0379* 0.0837* 0.0766 
[0.0191] [0.0204] [0.0455] [0.0460] 
Owns land 
-0.0562 -0.0634 -0.160 -0.107 
[0.112] [0.108] [0.235] [0.229] 
Polygamy 
-0.285 -0.275 0.314 0.289 
[0.189] [0.195] [0.316] [0.309] 
Cohabiting 
0.126 0.112 -0.472 -0.471 
[0.125] [0.130] [0.288] [0.277] 
Male age 
0.0114 0.0110 0.00998 0.0152 
[0.00834] [0.00840] [0.0210] [0.0212] 
Male years of 
schooling 
-0.00831 -0.00724 0.137 0.139 
[0.0329] [0.0320] [0.107] [0.104] 
Male takes alcohol 
0.139 0.144 0.669** 0.631* 
[0.149] [0.154] [0.318] [0.323] 
Woman older than a 
man 
0.669* 0.672* 0.753 0.691 
[0.358] [0.354] [0.462] [0.494] 
Woman more educated 
than a man 
-0.0828 -0.0738 -0.231 -0.206 
[0.233] [0.243] [0.410] [0.418] 
Same occupation 
0.232 0.259 -0.149 -0.144 
[0.159] [0.158] [0.283] [0.284] 
Highest education 
0.103* 0.103* -0.0922 -0.0806 
[0.0538] [0.0515] [0.124] [0.119] 
Household size 
0.0183 0.0211 0.0342 0.0375 
[0.0362] [0.0362] [0.0732] [0.0709] 
Location (urban=1) 
0.357* 0.371** 0.591* 0.661* 
[0.174] [0.178] [0.333] [0.328] 
     
Observations 206 206 363 363 
R-squared 0.347 0.350 0.161 0.150 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results in Table 5 indicate that IPV has no statistically significant association with wages, 
but has marginal significant association with earnings from self- employment.  While IPV may 
be associated with higher probability of a woman getting into self-employment, it is negatively 
associated with women’s earnings from self-employment. Thus, abused women in self-
employment earn relatively lower than those not abused. 
 
Since women were not randomly assigned to be under violent relationships, we potentially face 
a selection bias problem. Descriptive analysis and estimation for drivers of IPV reveals that 
women who have experienced IPV are characteristically different from those who have not. To 
control for self-selection bias, we apply the propensity score matching (PSM) method proposed 
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to estimate the causal effect of IPV on the labour market 
outcomes. Propensity score is defined as a conditional probability measure of treatment 
participation given the observable characteristics. For individuals with the same propensity 
score, the assignment to treatment is random; and it should look identical in terms of their 
observed covariates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In this study, PSM balances the distribution 
of observed covariates between those who have experienced IPV (the treated group) and those 
who have not experienced IPV (the control group), based on their propensity score. The 
propensity score in this case corresponds to the conditional probability of experiencing IPV, 
given the pre-treatment observable characteristics. It is estimated using binary (probit or logit) 
model as follows: 
 
𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑇𝑖
∗ > 0) = 1 − 𝐺(𝑋𝛽)     (3) 
 
Where, T is the binary treatment variable; 𝑇𝑖
∗is the latent variable for the treatment variable and 
𝐺(∗) is the cumulative distribution function of the normal or logistic distribution, and X is the 
vector of individual’s baseline characteristics.  
 
Since the outcome variables are assumed to be independent of the assignment, given the 
baseline characteristics (𝑋𝑖 ), they are independent of the assignment, given the propensity 
score, 𝑝(𝑥), as if assignment to treatment and control groups were random. The paper uses 
nearest neighbour (NN) matching as the matching algorithm. This technique matches a treated 
individual with the control-sample individual(s) who has the closest propensity score. Since 
we do not specifically have pre-treatment control variables, we use the variables which we 
assume that are not affected by the treatment, which is experiencing IPV. The individuals who 
are matched to the treated individuals become the comparison group and produce an estimate 
of the counterfactual. The simple difference in outcome variables between the treatment and 
the matched control individuals allows for the estimations of the average treatment effect for 








∑ 𝐿𝑗𝑗∈(𝑇=0) )𝑖       (4) 
  
Where 𝑁𝑇 is the number in the treated group (T = 1). 𝑁𝐶,𝑖 is the number in the comparison 
group corresponding to the 𝑖th observation of the treated group. And 𝑗 is an element of the set 
of matched comparison units obtained using nearest-neighbourhood matching set defined using 
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propensity score as 𝐴𝑖(𝑝(𝑥)) = {𝑝𝑗|𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗 ||𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗||} . 𝐿𝑖 is the value of outcome variable for 
the treated individual and 𝐿𝑗 is the outcome variable value for the comparison individual in the 
control group. 
 
ATT is defined only in the region of common support where there is an overlap of the 
distributions of the propensity scores of the treatment and control groups. Therefore, we start 
by examining the distributions of the propensity scores for the treated and the control group 
before and after matching. Figures 1 and 2 show that there was a difference between the 
distributions for the treated and control group before matching for lifetime IPV and current 
IPV treatments, respectively. This implies a potential selection bias into violent relationships, 
which would also create bias in the estimated effects. Matching the propensity score using NN 
matching creates a good overlap thus reducing the assignment bias based on observable 
characteristics. 
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Fig 2: Propensity score before and after NN matching for treatment, current IPV  
 
The results using the propensity score matching are summarized in Table 6. These results show 
that a woman who has experienced IPV both in her lifetime and in the current period (last 12 
months) is less likely to be out of the labour force. Such a woman is more likely to be self-
employed than the one who has not experienced IPV at least once in her lifetime or in the 
current period, which is similar to the findings from the probit models. This finding supports 
the HBM and complement Vyas et al (2015). In particular, avenue for self-employment may 
be a coping mechanism for adjustment against the utility-eroding IPV consequences, despite 
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Table 6: Effect of IPV on employment and earnings: Average Treatment effect on the 
Treated using propensity score matching technique 
 Treatment: Lifetime IPV 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Out of labour force Unmatched  0.18   0.26   -0.08***   0.02   -3.54  
 ATT  0.19   0.19   -0.00   0.03   -0.02  
Wage employment Unmatched  0.13   0.11   0.02   0.02   1.39  
 ATT  0.13   0.10   0.03   0.02   1.64  
Self-employment Unmatched  0.29   0.20   0.10***   0.02   4.37  
 ATT  0.29   0.20   0.09***   0.03   3.22  
Wage Unmatched  1,083,029   1,354,738   -271,709   340,627   -0.80  
 ATT  1,107,559   877,045   230,514   388,218   0.59  
Self-employment 
earnings 
Unmatched  5,929,880   7,084,744   -1,154,864   3,232,276   -0.36  
ATT  6,089,678   6,222,189   -132,512   4,319,172   -0.03  
      
 Current IPV 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Out of labour force Unmatched  0.20   0.25   -0.05**   0.03   -1.99  
 ATT  0.20   0.20   -0.00   0.03   -0.11  
Wage employment Unmatched  0.15   0.11   0.03*   0.02   1.67  
 ATT  0.14   0.12   0.03   0.02   1.06  
Self-employment Unmatched  0.30   0.21   0.09 ***  0.03   3.37  
 ATT  0.29   0.18   0.12***   0.03   3.63  
Wage Unmatched  1,121,186   1,303,315   -182,129   394,759   -0.46  
 ATT  1,088,073   784,805   303,268   534,072   0.57  
Self-employment 
earnings 
Unmatched  3,771,820   7,477,635   -3,705,814   3,755,870   -0.99  
ATT  3,946,790   8,042,990   -4,096,199   3,815,495   -1.07  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study was motivated by high levels of domestic violence in Tanzania, that 44% of ever-
married women have experienced physical or sexual violence by their current/most recent 
partner in their lifetime, which spells immense social costs. In addition, the study surmised 
from the literature that the relationship between intimate partner violence against women and 
labour opportunities, for example, is an empirical issue. Yet, empirical studies on Tanzania that 
have addressed the IPV problem are still scanty.   
 
Thus, as an attempt to fill the empirical gap, this paper has analysed the relationships between 
intimate partner violence and labour market outcomes in Tanzania. Using the data from the 
first wave of the Tanzania National Panel Survey (TNPS) (2008-2009), the paper used firstly 
the probit model to examine factors driving the probability of women to experience IPV; and 
secondly, it used the propensity score matching to estimate the effect of IPV on women’s 
probability of employment and earnings. 
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It has been found that the levels of IPV in Tanzania are still alarmingly high. For example, 
28.7% of women were found to have experienced lifetime IPV and about 16.7% of women to 
have experienced violence in the 12 months prior to the survey (current IPV). In comparison 
with developed countries the experienced IPV in Tanzania is relatively very high. The paper 
found that IPV is mainly male driven, with some male characteristics significantly driving the 
problem (alcohol abuse, young age, polygamy, cohabitation, among others). The violence was 
found to be higher in the rural areas than in the urban areas; for example, 33% of women in the 
rural areas were found to have experienced IPV in their lifetime, compared to 21% in the urban 
areas. The results have further showed that property ownership for women is still low and a 
majority of the women still accept to live by the oppressing traditional norms, which they use 
to justify IPV. For example, 60% of women in the survey accepted that a man is justified to 
beat his wife under certain (trivial) circumstances.  
 
With regard to employment and earnings, the study found IPV to be a catalyst to self-
employment for women, which may be a positive coping adjustment and may tilt the balance 
of power and enhance the bargaining, as posited by HBM. However, the results indicate also 
the negative side of IPV, which is that the business incomes from such self-employment 
ventures are likely to be depressed. In view of these findings, we still need, as a society, to raise 
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Appendix 1: Questions on Violence against Women in TNPS – First Wave 
Has your current partner or, any partner ever.... 
a) Slapped you or thrown something at you that could hurt you? 
b) Pushed you or shoved you? 
c) Hit you with his fist or with something else that could hurt you? 
d) Kicked you, dragged you, or beaten you up? 
e) Choked or burnt you on purpose? 
f) Threatened to use or actually used a gun, knife, or other weapon against you? 
g) Physically force you to have sexual intercourse when you did not want to? 
h) Did you ever have sexual intercourse you did not want because you were afraid of what 
he might do? 
 
Appendix 2: Questions on Wage Work and Self Employment 
Questions on Wage Work 
a) Did [household member] do any wage work during the last seven days? If No 
b) Did [household member] do any wage work during the last 12 months? 
 If a respondent reported Yes to either question he/she was asked the following: 
c) How much was [household member] last payment IF RESPONDENT HAS NOT 
YET BEEN PAID what payment do you expect? What period of time did this 
payment cover [hour; day; week; fortnight; month; quarter year; half year; year]? 
d) Does [household member] receive any payment for this work in any other form 
(apart from salary)? If Yes, What is the value of those payments and over what time 
interval [hour; day; week; fortnight; month; quarter year; half year; year]? 
Questions on Self Employment 
e) Did you operate any business or do any self-employed activity during the last week, 
other than agriculture? If No 
f) Did you operate any business or do any self-employed activity during the last 12 
months other than agriculture? 
 If a respondent reported Yes to one question he/she was asked: 
g) What was your net income (profit) from your business or businesses last week/month? 
 
